tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-996609237882090723.post5027531044698867465..comments2024-01-13T02:28:25.074-04:00Comments on Physicists of the Caribbean: I Like Locke (II) : FREEDOM !Rhysyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13219113442790412792noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-996609237882090723.post-28782789751927188702021-02-25T13:21:53.809-04:002021-02-25T13:21:53.809-04:00Thanks ! Seems to be a lot of feedback lately, whi...Thanks ! Seems to be a lot of feedback lately, which is nice.<br /><br />Ahh, nature versus nurture... I don't know. But I was wondering a while back if it's even possible to form an unbiased AI (https://decoherency.blogspot.com/2018/06/a-psychopathic-ai-is-truly-unbiased.html). I suspect probably not : we don't have a good enough definition of objective truth. Any AI we program will inherent some of our biases, though probably not all.<br /><br />On the other hand, some problems in AI unfairly discriminating (e.g. https://web.br.de/interaktiv/ki-bewerbung/en/) occur not because it's biased but because it isn't. AIs do not understand that correlation <> causation. They assume every correlation is real and significant, and thus make some downright weird judgements.Rhysyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13219113442790412792noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-996609237882090723.post-25914475130046877322021-02-24T03:29:59.303-04:002021-02-24T03:29:59.303-04:00Very interesting essay of your understanding (heh!...Very interesting essay of your understanding (heh!). It seems to me that religious faith and your agnosticism boils down to nature vs. nurture, and on that I agree. Of course one then has to decide the balance between the two (does my nature make me look at the stars more than the average person or my nurture from my non-stargazing parents who nonetheless supported that hobby when I was a child?), which is difficult to pin down.<br /><br />Is perhaps the very definition of sentience that struggle, and could that not be built into A.I.?<br /><br />Just curious, your blog is quite interesting.Scott Truesdellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12589581053781148137noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-996609237882090723.post-1866945412872364992021-02-23T10:13:52.200-04:002021-02-23T10:13:52.200-04:00This was so interesting that I added some further ...This was so interesting that I added some further thoughts here : https://decoherency.blogspot.com/2021/02/in-two-minds.htmlRhysyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13219113442790412792noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-996609237882090723.post-40736531120434980382021-02-18T04:06:58.601-04:002021-02-18T04:06:58.601-04:00Oooh, provocative ! :)
With regards to identity, ...Oooh, provocative ! :)<br /><br />With regards to identity, I should perhaps have been more deliberately vague. I do not know what the correct defintion of identity really is, I just thought that Locke had some interesting points. Discrete versus continuous, spatial versus temporal... different sorts of change may or may not be qualitatively different. I don't know.<br /><br />I would venture that when Locke describes different sorts of identites for animate and inanimate objects, he may be right. After all, a table is ultimately just a collection of atoms (unless you're a panpscyhist, I guess). So "table" is really just a mental label for that particular atomic configuration, and whether taking away a single atom really changes the identity of the table is arbitrary.<br /><br />By contrast, a person undeniably has consciousness, which is a core part of their identity even if not the whole. Whereas identities of inanimate objects are entirely mental constructs (e.g. Pluto didn't change in any measurable way just because a few killjoys decided it wasn't a planet any more), inner awareness itself is a large part of personal identity. That is, we apply mental labels to external objects, but we ourselves ARE mental beings. So I think it's entirely credible to suggest that these two sorts of identities are entirely different. <br /><br />Likewise, the rope and VHS tapes should be regarded only as indirect analogies; I don't think either is perfect, but both may be applicable in some limited regards.<br /><br />If I have to choose, I will cling to my subjective self above all. There is A self which has attributes. I just don't know exactly what that self is.<br /><br />Teleporters are interesting conundrums. I don't really know how the body-generated version of consciousness would experience teleportation. It's important to stress the non-physical but physically interactive element I'm suggesting here. My goal was only to propose a version of free will that's compatible with both science and subjective, common sense experience - as to the precise nature of consciousness, and just how exactly (and to what extent) it can affect matter, I deliberately make no claims. Such things would probably have to rely on experimentaion.<br /><br />Very nice blog by the way - bookmarked for further reading. :)<br />Rhysyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13219113442790412792noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-996609237882090723.post-90973101308136649922021-02-17T13:28:56.328-04:002021-02-17T13:28:56.328-04:00A good read. Incidentally, the rope analogy of per...A good read. Incidentally, the rope analogy of personality identity doesn't rescue the concept of a self i.e a self that persists through time.<br /><br />You quote Steven Hales who says:<br /><br />||There are many overlapping strands of psychological connection: personality, tastes, beliefs, memories, interests, preferences, desires and ambitions, to name a few.||<br /><br />A thing can change over time and yet still be that very same thing eg a table acquires scratches but is still that very same table. However, what if you were to swap its legs for the legs of another table of a different appearance? The self as a rope analogy is similar to the latter (legs swapped) rather than the former (table acquiring scratches).<br /><br />The rope analogy of personal identity entails there's no essence that endures. Indeed, the "strands of psychological connection" might all change from childhood to adulthood. In which case we quite *literally* would be a different person when we are an adult compared to when we were a child. Like smashing our table up and replacing it with a different table of a different appearance. <br /><br />But, it's even worse than this -- much worse. Suppose a replica was created of you. Since the replica has the precise same psychological state (same memories etc), then that replica *must* be you . .wait . .what?? Would you therefore seem to jump into the replica's body? I would guess you would say no. But, in that case, if your self stays in the original body, this is a denial that your self is *constituted* by such psychological traits. Read a relevant blog post bv me:<br /><br />http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2017/06/do-we-die-when-we-teleport.html <br /><br />I think that we have an essence, and memories and the like are not part of that essence. I explain what I mean here:<br /><br />http://ian-wardell.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-self-or-soul-as-mental-substance.html Ian Wardellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com