Science And The Free Market (II) : Solving Politics

Last time I asked, "why does science do so well, when politics and markets often fail ?". After all, there are plenty of intelligent people in all walks of life, and the basic network structure of academia doesn't seem to be that different from other areas. If we could only figure out just what it is that makes the scientific consensus so robust, so able to withstand the presence of idiots, maybe we could apply this elsewhere and make the world a better place full of rainbows and kittens.

Having dismissed some simpler explanations as at best limited (namely the people involved and their connections), in this post I'm going to suggest that the key reason science works is its method. The technique science has developed for grappling complex problems seems to be something very special. So let's see if science really does have a magic formula for success, and whether this can be used outside of the hallowed halls of academia.

This post is going start off as a little bit of a gushing review of the scientific method, but do remember : 1) horrific individual mistakes do happen; 2) the process takes a very long time.


How science gets it right

The process of doing research is messy to say the least. Here's my earlier attempt to illustrate it :

This apparent omnishambles somehow manages to give rise to profound truths : the size of the Universe, the nature of matter, why wombats have square poop. For individual researchers it works well; on a larger scale it performs miracles. It has led, quite literally, to turning lead into gold, landing a man on the moon, obliterating cities, and creating small rectangular objects that allow teenagers to access pornography whenever and wherever they want. Oh, and unlimited cat memes. Yay.

Let's start with the individuals. The scientific method is a bit like post-processing an image : it can make a good idea great, but it can't make a bad idea good. You need a fair bit of analytic intelligence to even get started (or at least mathematical ability); science is, it must be said, quite hard.

Nevertheless, the procedure matters a good deal. The basic procedure goes a bit like this. You have an idea, do background reading, think of a way to test it, do background reading to see if this is sensible and/or novel, collect the data you need, analyse it (with more background reading on methodology), see if it fits your interpretation, realise that it probably doesn't, think of something else you could extract from the data (yes, MORE background reading), and assuming it does you write something up and submit it to a journal, argue with the referee about your results (yep, that needs more background reading too), eventually get something published that vaguely resembles what you originally anticipated (or not), and then wait for the community to shoot it down, support it, or more likely simply ignore it (and yes, that means doing yet more reading) because no-one else cares that much except you.

Okay, maybe that didn't simplify it as much as I thought it would. What I want to get at is how this procedure works to determine the most plausible interpretation and meaning of the available data. Lots of these steps are also used outside of science, of course, but there's an awful temptation in other fields to skip ahead. If you have an idea, great, but if you don't test it experimentally or don't check to see if it's already been done, or if you don't bother to check your conclusion with anyone else... you're usually screwed. 

Science, on the other hand, is pretty insistent that you follow the whole dang procedure. And that's not a nice optional bonus - it's crucial. In case it isn't obvious, the whole thing doesn't scale linearly. Skipping a few steps here and there is like deciding to skip a few bricks when building a house - you'll end up with something, right enough, but it won't be nice to live in and eventually something will collapse and hit you on the head.


Previously I've looked in some detail at how people go about forming conclusions, which makes this task quite a bit simpler. The theory goes that when evaluating claims, people consider (consciously or otherwise, for better or for worse) :

• Evidence
• Coherency of the argument
• Comparison to pre-existing beliefs
• Trust in the source of the evidence
• The number of people who accept the statement
• How people will perceive them if they accept the idea

And we should probably add emotional bias into this mix. What seems plausible when forced to give a snap response can seem very different under proper scrutiny. Despite its complexity, the scientific method emphasises the logical, rational, evidenced-based aspects of evaluation, and decreases the reliance on meta-data (which can be influenced by all kinds of irrational factors) and emotive elements. It does this in several different ways.


Being your own worse enemy

To be a good scientist you should punch yourself quite often, but not too literally unless you're researching self harm.

Perhaps the most fundamental part of the modern scientific system is peer review. If you know that your report won't see the light of day unless a randomly-chosen colleague gives it the green light*, you're forced to consider things from other perspectives - effectively, into attacking your own findings and ideas to see if they stand up against a skeptic before you even try letting it loose against a genuine rival. You get a feel for the sort of arguments someone might use if they want to discredit you, so you take steps to make your findings as robust as possible before sending them out into the big wide world on their own. And you do this yourself but also through discussions with colleagues, even if you're the only author on a paper.

* You can of course present at a conference without peer review at all, but how the audience reacts is essentially just another aspect of peer review. The final results, which is what everyone cares about, are in research papers.

This is why there's all that background reading. By setting down the existing arguments that people have used, science forces an in-depth examination of the issue at hand - and more than it, it also gives metaknowledge of how the data was obtained, the strengths and weakness of different techniques, which ones are most common, etc. It compels you to search the literature for things you may not be aware of and resuscitates dormant memories of things half-heard in a conference long ago. This strongly emphasises an analysis of the evidence, the coherency of the argument, and how it fits in with existing knowledge (and of course whether existing ideas might be wrong).

By ensuring that the the idea is confronted with as much existing data as possible, it becomes very difficult to avoid addressing at least the major probable conflicts. Any ideas which severely contradict others are unlikely to survive, or at the very least, any such conflicts are likely to be stated very clearly in the final paper for all to see. It can and does happen that this processes ends potential projects before they even begin, because you realise it's already been done and/or your idea has already been discredited*. Science forces you to change as much as it does everyone else.

* I once spent maybe ~2 months convinced I'd found something really cool that other authors had missed. I did quite a lot of image processing to try and show it as clearly as possible, before I finally realised that the whole thing had been covered in a footnote by people who didn't find it terribly interesting for some reason.

The group aspect of this is important, since what one person might miss, another may spot - or may know who to ask. So the process of producing a written report not only forces you to consult the past, but also a wide range of contemporary sources. The precise network structure probably does matter a good deal here, if not for affecting the methods, then at least for connecting people with different ideas and knowledge.


Thinking with your... pencil ?

More generally, science relies heavily on extended cognition. Ideas you have on the spur of the moment are important, but the process of writing things down, setting out things in different ways (especially through statistical analyses and data visualisation) not only inspires new thoughts you wouldn't otherwise have had, but also also provides a detailed record that others can follow. And of course most fundamentally it allows you to do calculations that even Carol Vorderman couldn't do in her head. Numerical analysis allows you to see trends you couldn't possibly otherwise see, forcing you to objectively test and confront whether your preferred explanation is actually better or worse than others (and often leaves you wondering why the hell you preferred an explanation to begin with).

A subtler aspect is the the length of time all this takes. The constant, prolonged examination reduces emotional bias, as it's hard to sustain wild tear-your-clothes-off enthusiasm for months on end, even especially for Carol Vorderman - generally, at most you'll be quietly enthusiastic  Perhaps most importantly of all, while our default comparisons tend to be relative, recent, and local, the approach of scientific scrutiny helps tend them towards something approaching absolute, established, and global. Although sometimes our snap judgements do turn out to be correct, this protracted investigation is far more rigorous.


Wake up sheeple  !

While careful examination and research expands metaknowledge of processing and other aspects of understanding how previous research was done, it also reduces the reliance on potentially misleading metaknowledge we normally use when assessing a statement. It's awfully tempting to cite a large number of sources as evidence of correctness, and this can and does happen - but the arguments set down in a paper must still be assessed on their own merits even if in flagrant contradiction to what everyone else currently thinks.

And, almost by definition, papers are expected to present some new and interesting result, so there's an expectation on the part of the referee that it might challenge existing findings, reducing any skepticism they might have towards novelty. New results are the implicit goal of the whole process, so while the popularity of an existing idea might grant it preference, it certainly doesn't give it immunity from prosecution. This means that while ordinarily it can be entirely sensible to make judgements based on what everyone else's doing*, this herd mentality is greatly reduced through scientific analysis, even though it's certainly not eliminated completely. So saying, "all these other sheep are running forwards, I'd better run forwards too", might win a scientifically-minded sheep some credit with a reviewer, but not all that much.

* If all your friends jumped off a cliff, would you jump too ? Of course you would. Your friends aren't a bunch of nutters, so they must have had a very good reason for jumping off a cliff, and it's probably not a good idea to wait around and see what that reason actually is.

The process also reduces the reliance in trust in the source. If a random bloke on the internet tried to sell you discounted tickets to the zoo (or whatever), you might be suspicious. If you friend did it, you wouldn't be. Peer review makes it as though every published author was your friend, even if you haven't met them ! Well, okay, not really, but it does mean you have an idea of the struggle they went through to make it that far. You can be pretty confident that it's not nonsense (of course, you might still trust some authors more than others). At the same time, it doesn't mean you take their claims at face value either, because you know referees make mistakes and your reading the paper as part of the community is still part of the wider, extended review process. But your burden of judging who's trustworthy is greatly lessened, and leaves you free to concentrate on assessing the content.

And the process mitigates how much praise and shame authors can expect to receive. The network aspect of this is especially complex : sometimes we can be shunned for an unpopular belief that drives us to change our views, whereas sometimes this causes us only to dig our heels in. Praise and shame have been noted as major drivers of false beliefs, as they affect our standing in our social groups. Scientists are praised when their ideas seem plausible and at least respected if they publish errata or refute their own ideas - mistakes are allowed even for individuals. In contrast, lies are treated as almost unforgivable. Anyone found committing scientific fraud is swiftly tarred and feathered, although usually only metaphorically because you can't claim tar and feathers back on expenses.

Anonymity in the peer review process plays a very important role here. It means a junior researcher is less afraid to criticise a big scary professor of high reputation and/or influence, and means that if the author thinks the reviewer is a ugly, brain-dead moron, then they won't know who to direct their anger against - thus preventing hostility towards them in the future. It's very hard to bear a grudge against a mysterious stranger.

The review process itself also tends to deaden overblown rhetoric, forcing everyone to stick to the data. Its effect is usually to moderate the discussion, both increasing skepticism where needed and allowing interesting discoveries to be presented to a wider audience. Of course, none of this can never fully remove the emotional response of the community, but it does help.

And "help" is important. Peer review doesn't just mean someone else either approves or disapproves - more often than not it means they help improve. Yes, they can and do ultimately reject or allow papers, but this rarely happens without at least some adjustments first. Compromise is usually possible, and sensible authors and reviewers alike recognise that they shouldn't expect all their arguments/requests to be accepted. It's going to be very important to bear that in mind later on. So when Anakin Skywalker says that "people should be made to agree by someone wise" :

... he's being a twit, and hasn't read his Plato. Plato realised that sure, a benevolent omniscient dictator was indeed the best solution of government, but this just isn't practical. So instead we have laws - external, prior standards we all adhere too. Similarly, peer review doesn't mean forcing one side of the other to seek victory, but to "act together in support of the truest suggestion", as Plato put it. When it works well, peer review means that both sides follow the rules and don't say anything of consequence that they can't substantiate; both sides usually make concessions, and no-one is forced to agree to the opinion of some mythical wise despot.

Science doesn't stop scientists getting emotional, but does strip emotion out of the analysis they do. It does not lead to perfect objectivity, or prevent us having preferences, but it does greatly restrict what can be set down in print. Speculation and interpretation are not killed outright, but kept brief. The constant criticism, being done in the knowledge that the goal is to establish truth (and not knowing who the referee is), usually does not lead to anyone hating anyone else : competitors can become future collaborators, and at at some level we all benefit from and can build on each other's research. Peer review acts to promote a moderate level of competition, not send it into a death spiral of hyper-polarisation where everyone constantly resorts to "yo momma" jokes by way of argument.


So that's the magic. Science forms conclusions through competitive collaborations, marrying the collaborative strengths of group size and diversity with the independent creativity of competition. The precise method it uses forces skepticism of all parties without falling into hostility. Hurrah !


Why doesn't this work elsewhere ?

Okay, so science has this successful recipe for eventually converging on the truth. As mentioned, some of these stages are applied elsewhere, but not usually with the same formality and degree of rigour. But how come competition in science prevents a false consensus, whereas in other sectors it just makes people incredibly angry ?

As far as I can tell, both the network structure and process behind political decision-making are very different to the scientific approach. Politics all too often feels not like a vehicle for progress, despite the earnest intentions of many politicians, but an engine for the utter annihilation of rational thought.

Nice to see that the art of Roman realpolitik isn't quite dead yet.

While competitive collaborations certainly exist in the commercial sector, I reckon that it's not this network aspect that's responsible for their failure so much as it is the exact process used and the goals sought. Not least of which is that for science, truth itself is the product - there is little point in doing fraudulent academic research, because everyone is trying to disprove you anyway. Your ideas can and will be tested. So the safest bet by far is to be honest and careful, and there are far better avenues to fame and glory than researching the mating habitats of toads*.

* Although anyone who did manage to achieve fame and glory by researching the mating habitats of toads would be a formidable fellow indeed, and I've like to meet them.

In contrast, commercial products are designed for sale and corporations have much less of a stake in each other's success. Few scientists are arrogant enough to think they have a monopoly on truth or even want one, whereas in the corporate world, crushing your opponents* is a laudable goal. And their products have to respect truth to a far lesser degree than scientific discoveries : adverts just have to be convincing enough to make sales, and products just good enough to keep people satisfied for a while. Ultimately they have to make as much money as possible. The demand for rigour is much less, and in adverting honesty is about as desirable as being suddenly crushed to death by a beluga whale. The competitive aspect works to give people what they want, not necessarily what they benefit from.

* Well not literally, obviously : better to absorb their employees into your own. But this still reduces their independence, and with relatively limitless funds and potential workers, the tendency towards global dominance for a sufficiently large corporation is far greater than for any research institute. CERN is huge, but its whole nature prevents it from ever attracting or desiring researchers outside of particle physics.

Politicians, on the other hand, barely seem to even employ competitive collaborations much at all. Cross-party issues are rarely treated as such, and ideas suggested by the opposition tend to be simply ignored. Even mass public protests do not always work. As mentioned last time, politicians themselves don't even get to say what they really think very much, still less to act and investigate as they might wish. If science is a loose network that tolerates and even welcomes dissent, then political parties are more like highly centrist hives full of especially angry bees. And it's very hard to trust a politician if they say things only because they've been clearly whipped into line.

There are exceptions that prove the rule. In "Why We Get The Wrong Politicians", Isabel Hardman describes that some of the committees in which laws are drafted still work well when they're not under control of party diktat. When politicians are given some level of independence, they're actually able to scrutinise legislation in a basically functional way. It's not perfect, but it's a damn sight better than many other aspects of politics; when committees are closely controlled by the party bosses, the result is little better than a farce. Any collaborations that do exist even within individual parties are all too easily snuffed out, never mind forming a cross-party consensus with The Enemy.

But politicians have other problems as well. Hardman is at pains to describe how much money it costs a candidate (out of pocket) to even stand a chance of being elected, which immediately enforces a strict, seriously weird selection effect on who gets to manage the country. Tuition fees notwithstanding, science has no such ridiculous constraint : personal wealth is irrelevant.

Science forces people to confront arguments directly. Politicians can easily avoid this - they can use whatever tactic persuades voters. If attacking the personality of their opponents is more persuasive than debunking their arguments, then that's what they'll do. Theatrical performances awash with high rhetoric are the norm. This undeniably makes it very entertaining (if you find Jermey Kyle or Springer entertaining) but it does the exact opposite of encouraging rational, objective analysis. Even worse, rhetoric often disguises a lack of understanding of the data, forcing voters to make choices based on little more than their subjective judgement of who they like best.

Others have pointed out that this would at least be better than the current absurdity that passes for governance.

Compared to science, the political arena has gone arse over tit when it comes to praise and shame. Scientists are actively praised for trying things that don't work, and seldom lose respect for making mistakes unless they're seriously awful (at least in pure research), whereas if they're caught lying then they barely have time to kiss their career goodbye. Politicians, however, are hailed as idiots if they try things which don't work, are rarely treated with anything but contempt if they even apologise for making mistakes*, yet brazen lies often win them elections. This is completely mental.

* One of my biggest pet hates is people who shout about how awful people are but don't give them a chance to change. These people, especially those who think "woke" is a sensible word, don't really want to make the world better, they just enjoy making other people feel bad.

To be fair this aspect isn't really politicians fault. Politicians, corporations, and scientists are all constrained in action by their audience, but for the latter, the audience is expert and trained in using a sophisticated system designed for objectivity (scientists do suffer the wrath of the idiotic media, but mainly their own critics are each other - most discoveries never make it anywhere near the gutter press). The other audiences are not. That is not to say they're stupid (though they often are), but they lack any kind of formal analysis procedure. Who buys a robotic talking cat and actually tests that it does everything it says on the manual ? Who's dedicated and skilled enough to fact-check political speeches, and how many people even bother using professional fact-checking websites ?

Oops.

Politics fails because of politicians themselves and their audience. The system is designed to give people a choice, and therefore to some extent that means presenting bizarre and pointless alternatives. This works well enough when all participants are reasonably sensible, but it's vulnerable. The recent failures are but the latest in a long line of problems, albeit perhaps rather extreme examples (at least in peacetime). In Britain, we happen to have the highly peculiar situation of the leaders of both major parties being exceptionally ill-suited; it's not that uncommon to have one, but two at once is rare. The role of sheer bad luck should not be underestimated, but that is no reason to suggest we can't make the system more robust. Quite the opposite.


Make Politics Scientific Again

Or more accurately, "for once". The lessons from the success of science and the failures of science seem clear. So can we design a better system ?

I believe we can, but it's going to be radical. While Hardman suggests a number of reforms that would improve the system a great deal, I'm going to suggest something much more extreme. Science is investigative, whereas politics is mainly about making decisions from available data - but the two goals are not totally different. So, don't make scientists into politicians, that will lead to disaster. Instead, make politicians operate scientifically.

No, I'm not sure this is a good idea either. Good thing this is only a blog and not an actual experiment, eh ?

Choose wisely

First, remove the money-based selection criteria. Allocate a fixed amount of public funding for every candidate standing in every seat, with some limitations to prevent the numbers spiralling out of control. Parties would retain control of which candidates they select to run for office, but their selection criteria would have to change.

In science we use a mixture of expertise from theoretical and observational backgrounds, and in politics it should be no different. For the theoretical, have parties seek out candidates from academic backgrounds but in specific areas : historians, psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, political scientists, and lawyers; for the observational front, find people who have actually worked in different sectors at different levels of seniority, be that on a factory floor, at a farm, in retail, or wherever (and throw in a few professional public speakers as well). It shouldn't be possible to become a defence minister without having served in the armed forces, nor become a science minister without having several published papers. Make our elected representatives be, well, representative.

It's important to stress that this would be no kind of ivory-tower elitist club. In fact, by removing the need for personal funding, it would greatly increase the chance of ordinary people achieving high office. And anyone could always stand as an independent. But the make-up of Parliament would likely look very different to its current situation, because if the role of politicians is to make policy, then dammit, a wealth-based selection system is monumentally stupid. Yes, you're going to need Parliament to have a skill set disproportionate to the population as a whole, but no, being rich has bugger all to do with it, for goodness bloody sake. Except in the treasury, possibly.


Write laws as if they were research projects

Define the role of a politician to be that of a researcher. Their aim is to come up with the best policies possible, supported by the evidence. Anything proposed for vote in Parliament should have gone through the same level as rigour as an academic research paper : it must cite existing research, it must be clear and avoid rhetoric, it must be scrutinised by an anonymous peer or external expert in that field (perhaps chosen by a full-time editor who would essentially manage the Parliamentary journal). Let the European Research Group actually become published researchers, if the feckless twerps think they're so smart.

Allow politicians a consultancy budget, where they can bring in outside experts (importantly, from a pre-established group chosen by an independent body instead of whoever they feel like) for help and advice in drafting their papers as well as utilising the existing committees. Demand at least some co-authors be recognised experts in their field (this is important for smaller parties, who may only have a few MPs and would otherwise become pointlessly specialist). Encourage cross-party co-authorship, and where the authors are only of a single party, bias the referee selection to be either external to Parliament or from another party. This gives MPs a mutual stake in each other's proposals while still being competitors. It will also have a selection effect of dissuading bullies from applying in the first place.

Contrary to what you might expect, the skeptical review process can be extremely successful at getting to the truth even with fiercely opposing views, so long as it's well-managed (more on that in a bit). A wide pool of referees leads diminishes the chance of getting a biased report, whereas if the pool if small, as it would be if the default is to seek a reviewer from another party, then the chance that roles will be reversed in future is high. This would give politicians a stronger incentive to cooperate when reviewing each other, while external sources could be sought when an impasse is reached.


Separation of talents 

Thus, use politicians to define policies that are actually supported by the evidence with a strong degree of rigour (this doesn't forbid more radical ideas at all*, it just prevents them happening without justification). Use politicians (and consultants) with legal expertise to ensure their proposal is already legally watertight before it even gets to Parliament. Then use professional speakers in the same way that science uses science advocates : help them advise the politicians by all means, but let the orators do the bulk of the work in presentation**. The actual authors can play a secondary role, thus separating the arts of persuasion and objective analysis. By no means would this absolve the original authors from scrutiny - some degree of persuasive force will always be required from them, and it's essential that they themselves are accountable to various Parliamentary committees as well as the people. But let most of the work be done by professionals.

* Seriously. While politics was struggling with the idea that women should have the vote, science was realising that time runs at different rates in different places. A century later and politics is wondering if gay marriage is okay, while scientists are pondering if there are multiple realities. Science is a highly creative process tempered by evidence; politics... isn't.
** Real research has plenty of interesting moments but awfully long periods of extreme tedium. This doesn't make for good television, but we'll still need the public to be at least slightly interested in (rather than excited by) what's going on. 

Politicians already use external consultants, of course, but with a free hand. I propose restricting who they can choose for spin doctors and political strategists. The goal is to make the whole business about policy as much as humanly possible; forging a true consensus is not the same a backroom marriage deal of convenience, which seems to be the only kind of unholy alliance politicians are currently capable of.


Smash the hives

Let's not stop there. Give politicians the same powerful competitive collaboration model that works so well in other sectors. Do not abolish political parties, but greatly restrict their power over their own MPs, encouraging a truly broad church where everyone gets to say something close to what they really think, but only publish what can survive rigorous analysis (as in scientific conferences versus papers). Let parties be responsible for selecting candidates, but thereafter only for facilitating the aims of their individual MPs, not for telling them to shut up and toe the line. Remove whips entirely, or at most retain them for only a few key pledges. Tribalism in politics ? Bam, knocked on the head, right there. Party affiliation would serve more to identify suitable referees than anything else.

Give the poor buggers some training, either when applying to be a candidate, or perhaps in a period lasting a few months before office. This training needs to be done by independent groups not affiliated with any party. We don't need to go the whole hog of treating politicians like PhD students (that's one aspect of science that could use a lot of improvement anyway), but getting them to do a small "research" project before they take office would let them hit the ground at least at a brisk walk.

Fund the entire thing publically, a la academia (ditching the grant system, which is stupid). No more trade unions or wealthy individual donors calling the shots for different parties : that system is positively berserk. He who plays the piper calls the tune, whereas Plato rightly said :

We maintain that laws which are not established for the good of the whole state are bogus laws, and when they favour particular sections of the community, their authors are not citizens but party-men; and people who say those laws have a claim to be obeyed are wasting their breath.

So no more nonsense about funding political parties via any other method than through the state. Politicians are servants of the people : not one person nor any particular group of people, but all the people, dammit.


Empower Parliament, not the government - end the "winner takes all" approach

Let the government be explicitly subject to the sovereign will of Parliament. It shall have a few executive powers on which Parliament will not be consulted, but all major policies will be produced and enacted by Parliament. Let any MP of any party be able to submit a motion (the government shall have no power to decline the debate, nor prevent votes from happening, nor to suspend or delay them), as scientists from any institute can submit papers to any journal. There will still be an advantage to winning a majority, since that party will be able to submit the most proposals, but it will also mean that the other parties do not sit idly by like great big lemons for five years, having a voice but no real power at all.

Consider restrictions on who can vote in Parliament (what's the point of someone voting on something they don't understand ?), either at the initial or final stages, utilising their recognised specialities. Such designations would be enacted by a body chosen independently, who will assess if MPs are sufficiently expert with no regard whatsoever for which party is currently in government. If accepted, let that proposal be subject to revision by the entire body of the Lords. All these independent bodies could be part of a "political council" that fulfils the same interface role as existing scientific councils.

Just as peer review by other parties and/or external experts will affect the dynamic of the House tremendously, so should the opposition be given some real teeth : big, nasty, pointy teeth. Allowing them to propose motions is one thing, but insufficient. Yes, they can already hold the government to account through criticism, but that's rarely enough. Hardman emphasises that the role of praise and shame is effective in dealing with many politicians, but this doesn't help against people who genuinely don't care. And there seems to be a bias towards such people reaching leadership positions, since "the worst are full of passionate intensity", as Yeats put it. So for starters end the lying; those found to repeat known falsehoods after being corrected on it need not to be merely exposed (that doesn't affect them in the slightest and the voters don't care about it) but actually experience a meaningful penalty. Like being deposed, barred from office, imprisoned, or for my preference covered in honey and attacked by angry badgers. Nothing less will work.

Seriously. One of the most stupid judgements of any court is that it's okay for politicians to brazenly lie to the people. What the hell kind of free society do we live in if not to be free from deceipt ? 

Furthermore, let there be some major governmental powers which are subject to explicit approval by the main opposition party. Plato warned us against the approach where "the winners take over the affairs of state so completely that they totally deny the losers any share of power." The current winner-takes-all approach is far too strong : not only is your vote wasted if your preferred candidate doesn't win, but it's also largely wasted if your party doesn't win. This is so inherently divisive that it actively discourages sensible policy-making, since the goal is to get one over on your opponent rather than do something good. The exact details of this I will leave, as they need to be very carefully considered : the aim is that the major parties co-operate on some issues, not that they continuously render each other impotent. Co-operation should be routine and expected, not a nuisance that the government can claim is preventing them from getting anything done.

Make politics investigative

All this will slow down the whole process considerably, but it will replace the loud theatrical shouting matches - entertaining though they are - with proper investigation and scrutiny. A much more experimental approach of lawmaking is also called for. Even when a law is fully passed, insist on trials before it can be rolled out nationally (the public hate this, but that difficulty must be overcome - for science, trying something which doesn't work is counted a success, although obviously that needs adjustment for politics !). Following this there would need to be another paper produced to analyse the results, after which it might just be possible for the House to reach something like a proper consensus.

Finally, the review process used in science needs to be adjusted for the political sphere. As scientists do not have any innate reasons or tendencies to attack each other on sight, journal editors currently play a minor role. For politics they will need to be more active - not acting as a second referee on the proposal itself, but judging whether the author and referee are acting in accordance with the agreed standards (in particular, whether they are really tackling the relevant arguments directly). Unlike the refereeing, that only needs broad familiarity with the subject matter, not specialist knowledge. This keeps them truly independent (being impartial really is possible if that's your goal and role) and prevents the need for an infinite chain of referees or Anakin Skywalker's wise despot. We might also consider making all stages of the reports and responses public, so that everyone can see if the process has indeed been fair or not.

There, that should do it.


Summary and Conclusions

The future of politics, if I have anything to say about it.

Plato's Republic was based on the principle that good people could only be discovered; Laws on the idea that people could also be controlled and cajoled into becoming virtuous. Plato's latter approach was in some respects very crude, rewarding and punishing people much like dogs until they did what Plato thought was best. Fortunately, society has advanced quite a bit since ancient Athens.

No-one could come up with modern scientific methodology from theory alone, not even Plato. I've lifted this complex mix of discovery and persuasion, and its checks and balances, directly from observation. We select known experts (academics and others alike) and give them a system proven time and time again to foster objective, rational analysis. The system works both by selecting people who are able to work within it, rejecting the most irrational, stubborn, and the just plain stupid, and then dealing with the inevitable human fallibilities of those selected. It accepts that even the most well-intentioned and intelligent have some really daft ideas and bloody stupid biases, and does its damnedest to mitigate that. And it works very, very well for science.

I mean, it doesn't stop every problem, obviously, but the system does tend to stop the worst of it.

To give credit to Plato, this isn't all that far off the fundamental basis of Laws. Training people to use the scientific method can indeed help them to be scientific and coolly analytical in other areas. But only continuous, rigorous enforcement of the system, following external, common rules, is able to keep them on the straight and narrow. That's why merely parachuting a bunch of scientists into Parliament is never going to work : the astonishing results of science come from a collective effort, not from individual geniuses.


Everyone hates common sense

Many things here should probably be re-phrased in more Parliamentary language, but the principles still apply. Seek to forge consensus as the norm, not an obstacle to be circumvented by knavish tricks. Restrict the tribal aspect of politics as much as possible. Allow politicians expression free from party policy, but constrain their policies to be based on a thorough, cross-party and/or external review. Retain giving people a choice in voting. Retain the party system that can draw together people who share at least some common attributes. But stop allowing people to vote for bullies and thugs, who would do miserably in a system where cooperation is as important as competition. Have their psychopathic tendencies checked by far more than merely exposing their problems, which they don't give a damn about anyway. And bring in genuine skepticism and doubt, as opposed to the current system where everyone hates everyone else simply because they're not in their own stupid political club - or worse, has to merely say that they hate them because they're on the other side.

In terms of parliamentary reform, this is undeniably extreme. But it many ways it's not radical at all. It's not crazy to demand external review so that policies are produced with a high standard of rigour and impartiality. It's not insane to say that Parliament should represent the whole people and not whoever happens to win the latest election, denying everyone else much of a say. It's not mad to take the money out of politics and make the system more transparent. And I don't think it's lunacy to suggest that we apply a model proven to work, that fosters rational skepticism without promoting hostility, and that combines the benefits of both collaboration and competition. More pragmatically, it keeps the basic parliamentary structures and party system; the average voter will see no changes except for better policies and less bullshitting.

At least some of what I've suggested ought to be close to reality anyway. I don't doubt that many politicians do put a lot of work into their proposals, consulting and reading evidence just as I've said, and even seeking cross-party agreement. But I do doubt, very strongly, that these standards are always applied. To insist on mandatory, uniform standards of skeptical, anonymous examination is hugely different from allowing politicians to consult experts as and when they please.

I've skipped over the electorate and the Lords, neither of which has an obvious counterpart in academia. I would suggest that the first-past-the-post system be retained for MPs, but allocate a set of Lords allowed to vote in direct proportion to the vote share for each party. Not every Lord will be allowed to vote in each Parliamentary session; their allocation will be set by their party. This then combines multiple systems : two democratic voting procedures together with expert appointment*, and by numerically restricting the Lords it prevents people with no real or relevant qualifications at all from having a say. I'm also going to skip the tricky issue of local versus national-issue MPs; my emphasis has been on the national side of things and local politics is really another topic.''

* Plato and Cicero alike encouraged the use of multiple systems rather than wholly favouring one or the other, since each have advantages and disadvantages.


What about other ideas ?

Two of the most popular other "radical" proposals I see floating around the internet are proportional representation and the direct election of government ministers. Both presume that it's better politicians we need, not a better system of decision-making. PR does at least recognise that we'd probably have more coalitions and collaborations in such a system, but doesn't by itself propose how we get politicians to work together. Direct elections of ministers does away with the damaging tribal system, but requires many more elections and a highly active, motivated electorate. That somewhat misses the point of a representative system, which is supposed to take the fine details away from the voters so they can run their own lives without undue bother.

This proposal explicitly sets out the mechanism by which politicians collaborate. It's not absolute and doesn't mean everything must be reached by forcing mutual enemies to reach some half-baked compromise. It keeps the burden of choosing ministers on the elected officials, but prevents appointments of unqualified idiots who only got there through rhetorical skills - which is, I assume, the main goal of those suggesting direct elections anyway.

The more difficult aspect for this idea is that it swings the balance of the concept of "representative democracy" firmly in favour of representative. True, it allows both first past the post (or some other system) to operate alongside proportional representation, using a different system in different houses. It avoids the winner-takes-all approach of contemporary British politics, giving a say to those who lost. In that sense it gives voters more choice, since pretty much all political views will get genuine representation, each party some genuine power.

But fundamentally, its emphasis on cooperation makes it harder for voters to have a direct say in policy. Currently, so long as a government wins a majority, people know more or less what they're voting for (except when they elect someone very untrustworthy, which is a big problem). With this system they'll have less knowledge of which policies they'll end up with. This goes against my own preferences, though coalition governments do seem to work in most of Europe. Still, I'd like to find a way to include some aspect of more direct voter influence over policy.

But perhaps that too can wait for another time. The elephant in the room is the media. Without getting them to reform as well, any changes to the political system aren't going to be much more use than re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.

But look how neat they are !

I hate to end on a pessimistic note, so I won't. See, there's an optimistic take in suggesting that the system used matters more than the people chosen. Democracy, supposedly, is founded on the notion that ordinary people are capable of doing extraordinary things, while it's often said that our knowledge and intelligence outstrip our wisdom. Here I'm suggesting that there's a good reason that science runs so far ahead of politics : it's not because one group is especially better (or even just more rational) than another - we all know where that road leads. No, its only because one group has found, through extremely arduous effort that took many centuries, a better system to manage itself than the other.

Science has given us discoveries and devices that have reshaped the planet and ourselves, not always for the better. But perhaps these products of the scientific system are relatively minor. Perhaps it's that system itself, proven to unleash the potential of ordinary people who throw up drunk in the street and then the next day decode the human genome or peer into the depths of the Universe, which is science's greatest contribution to society of all. Or perhaps it's all just bollocks.

Science And The Free Market

Politics is pretty shite, isn't it ? Whether you're a left-leaning kale-munching vegan anarchcic panpsychic hipster who hates the idea of "rules", or a right-wing "lock 'em up and throw away the key if they so much listen to jazz music" type, I suspect we can all agree that politics is about as much fun as an unexpected brick to the gonads.

Science, on the other hand, is very much not shitty. Most of the hardcore, truly anti-science "it's all subjective and everything is made of wishes and moonbeams" brigade are largely confined to the realm of the internet. Admittedly the sort who think science is great except for this one thing (vaccinations/GM food/global warming/whatever) are rather more numerous, but that's another issue. Most people, having the common sense to realise that computers wouldn't work and planes wouldn't fly if our basic scientific theories weren't at least on to something, accept that science more or less gets it right in the end. It's an ongoing struggle to explain the finer details, but this fundamental point seems to be widely accepted.

So why is this ? Why does science seem to be high performance whereas so many other institutions seem to be at best dysfunctional, at worst outright harmful ? How does science manage to establish objective truth so well while politicians seem to prefer to actively ignore it ? Why do scientists actively enjoy having their theories overturned while a politician would sooner walk off a cliff than admit to any imperfections ? Surely, if we could only apply these lessons from science to other aspects of society, we would do nothing except make the world a happier, nicer place.

A confession : this post is a sort of preamble. When I thought I was about to finish, I suddenly realised that I had all the tools to forge a better political system starting me in the face, and I could hardly let that go. So in this post I'll look mainly at the contributing but less important factors : the people involved and the networks they live in, why science has some intriguing similarities to the free market so beloved by conservatives, and I'll emphasise that not everything in the world is quite so bad as it seems (though it is pretty bad).

But mainly this post only exists because it was necessary to write it in order to figure out part two, which is much more interesting. There I'll look at what really makes science work and present a proposal for a parliamentary system designed to Make Politics Work Again. My limitation here is that I'm going to focus on the scientific/political processes within their own systems, not within the wider context of the public/media perception. These are important, probably more so than the systems themselves, but in fairness restructuring the whole of society is a wee bit much to bite off in one go.


What is it that science does well ?

There's a nice, very tongue-in-cheek chart in Niall Ferguson's broken masterpiece on societal networks :

I particularly like the one for Microsoft, where lots of different departments are pointing guns at each other. It's very silly, but it makes a serious point. In any organisation, not only is it important which individuals interact, but the nature of that interaction is also critical. People can see each other as peers, rivals, underlings, authorities, casual acquaintances, sex objects, doormats, etc. They can also assess each other as competent, stupid, unprofessional, hilariously smelly, moronic, reliable, and a host of other weird and wonderful personality traits.

Both the structure and behaviour of scientific institutions matters to their success. Key to this is that mistakes are absolutely integral to the process - it is literally true that it's not research if you know what you are doing; failure is always an option. I also spit in disgust on the notion that progress is driven by lone revolutionary geniuses; no man is an island, and while there are certainly geniuses, virtually all of them stand on the shoulders of people of about average height, who often go around doing really dumb things.

Yet because, rather than in spite of, this apparently perverse predilection to accept mistakes with good grace, science is astonishingly successful - within certain limits. When it comes to analysing the data at hand, the consensus viewpoint seems to be feckin' awesome at accepting the best, most rational viewpoint the current data and methodology suggests. That sentence has been delicately phrased : to change one's mind based on new evidence is no bad thing, and once upon a time it was entirely sensible to consider the Earth to be flat and genuinely brainless to suggest that it was round.

I call this the efficient consensus hypothesis. That is : the current consensus gets pretty close to (though rarely actually reaches) the most rational conclusion currently possible. For today's exercise, that's how I shall define truth, rather than using a more absolute standard; strictly speaking science does not describe truth, if there even is such a thing. I shall ignore deeper philosophical questions as to what we mean by rationality and whether it's always a good thing. It's anyway clear to anyone with an ounce of sanity that politics is not nearly rational enough, and that's my main target for reform today.

Let me break that claim down, just to be even more emphatic. I apologise to anyone who thinks I'm labouring the point, but I've learned that the internet is full of unnecessary pedantry and the wilfully stupid, so it pays to be clear.

• Scientists are good at doing science. They are not necessarily also amazing basketball players or fashion designers or zookeepers, although some of them are. They're good at analysing the data and solving the problems put before them : I will here make no claims regarding their broader critical thinking skills whatsoever. I will not even comment on their abilities as predictors, only their capacity for analysing current data - not for accounting for how conditions and circumstances may change in the future and how different factors may interact in novel ways. 
• The scientific consensus is strongly, though not perfectly, robust against conclusions which defy the current evidence and analytical methods. It does not preclude individual researchers from being lunatics (indeed, some have it that a consensus without any dissent is a sign of systemic, groupthink bias). It's the capacity of the group to establish truth I want to look at here, not the individual elements.
• The consensus view generally changes rapidly and correctly in accordance with the available evidence. It is imperfect and incomplete, but ultimately successful. For example, there was a time not so long ago when science was able to show how an aeroplane flies while simultaneously having nothing much to say about how to design a nuclear bomb.

The key thing to remember is that I'm simply claiming that modern science (say, as done in the last couple of centuries or so) rapidly accepts the best conclusions currently possible, not that it never makes mistakes - in fact it can't advance at all without making mistakes. In my view, whenever one looks at just about any claim that scientists could have done better, one finds that this is nonsense given proper context. Science continuously improves not just its findings but its methods as well - finding mistakes in those methods is part of the process. I think it is rare indeed that the scientific consensus has ever been at odds with reality when there was good evidence / better methodology staring it in the face, at least for any significant length of time.

How, then, does science accomplish this amazing feat ?

It's because scientists are just better people than everyone else, obviously

"I'm, too snooty for my shirt, so snooty it hurts..."

This is the hope of those wanting to see more scientists in politics. I previously went on an extended rant about this, concluding that this wouldn't work without wholesale change to the system (next time I'm at last going to at last suggest what sort of wholesale change that might be).

But I suppose in principle it could be that scientists are all innately more curious and interested in the truth than other people - maybe the network stuff is just an emergent consequence of scientists' natures rather than a cause of it. But even then, there would have to be something about academia that does an outstanding job of selecting such people in the first place, so there would still be valuable lessons to learn. And the network structure would still matter, since in order for opinions to change rapidly, there must be efficient communication between all interested parties.

But I don't find selection a terribly convincing explanation. Scientists have diverse personalities and interests, even if there is (maybe) a greater tendency to prefer staying in binge watching science fiction shows and avoid talking to anyone more lively than a cactus. I've met people who are genuinely interested in the truth and others who, methinks, doth protest too much, who clothe their agenda by loudly insisting on how wonderfully unbiased they are. There are those who are exceptionally, almost unbelievably well-informed about the entire state of their field and others with more limited knowledge. And outside of their field of expertise, plenty of scientists have some damn fool ideas about the world.

Moreover, the desire to keep learning can be found in people of all walks of life. It's not only scientists who like documentaries or read the news or change their minds. True, some people only enjoy learning things which they're already prepared to accept, but still many non-scientists can delight in learning things which contradict what they previously believed. At least in some circumstances, at any rate.

On the other hand, I should also mention that I simply don't buy the popular suggestion that everyone is a natural-born scientist and the education system drums it out of them : I think all youngsters are curious simply because they don't know very much and know they don't know very much. They've no choice but to be curious, otherwise they wouldn't learn anything and natural selection would quickly take over. So it seems to me that selection plays only a limited role. Scientists don't have a monopoly on reasonably-minded people, nor are they exclusively sensible themselves : sensible people enter, endure, and are perhaps created by other networks besides science. Something else is going on.

Maybe it's more about the system scientists operate in than the people themselves

After all, it's easy to be a saint in paradise. Unfortunately no-one has yet extended this to the logical extreme of giving everyone MOAAARR PUPPIES.

I've mentioned this before a few times, most explicitly when comparing science to politics, and why we shouldn't expect scientists to fare very well as politicians. There are many different reasons for this. For one, scientists are trained to analyse the facts when forming a conclusion, without regard for people's feelings - if they did account for how people would perceive the facts, they'd be lousy scientists. Well, except for the social sciences, obviously.

But scientists also exist in an environment which supports this process. In contrast, partisan political systems are explicitly designed to give people a choice regardless of the facts, so the opposition parties criticise the government almost regardless of what they do (and the media constantly attack literally everyone as though they were worse than Hitler). There's no reason at all to think that scientists would do especially well in that kind of atmosphere. This is also, perhaps, why ex-military figures traditionally don't do well in politics either. I've also described how the routine, ludicrously extreme criticism by the media renders political bullshitting all but inevitable - no matter how honest and well-intentioned any politician may be to begin with.

Another perspective is to consider how science arrives at a consensus. That is, it doesn't hold a vote and decide, "right lads, we'll assume this is true and move on.". Rather the consensus is the emergent majority viewpoint : it's what most people happen to believe after quasi-independently examining different ideas, but at no point is a vote required or taken.

This sort of quasi-independent examination appears to be rare indeed in politics. Politicians are not even allowed to express their own thoughts, much less pursue investigations at their own direction. If a scientist says something unpopular with other scientists, they'll have to fight to defend their idea but that's about the extent of it; if a politician says something voters and/or their party machinery disapproves of, they're liable to lose their job. There's a much, much greater constraint for a politician to say things people already want to hear and do what the rest of their party tells them. The scientific network is a lot looser, far less threatening, and deliberately more tolerant of dissent than political entities.


A balancing act

The balancing act often fails when it comes to individual scientists, but, as we'll see a bit later on, not for the system as a whole. 

Tolerance of dissent and a loose, fairly egalitarian network make it easy to explain why science doesn't fall victim to a false consensus - that is, a majority viewpoint held simply because it's already the majority viewpoint, not because the evidence is actually compelling. As well as individual freedoms (not afforded to politicians) I've suggested that this is avoided because of the competitive collaborations that make up scientific institutes around the world. Each has a vested interest in disproving the other, with the consensus emerging from both collaboration and competition between different groups.

Individual researchers experience two competing motivations. On one hand, they try and publish as many papers as possible because this is good for their career - which naturally tends to encourage salami publishing of very incremental, mediocre results of little importance and controversy. That tends towards at best slowing progress, and worst stalling it. But on the other hand, researchers need to publish papers which are as radical as possible, because if they can convince people they've made an astonishing new discovery then that's a) innately interesting and b) very good for one's career indeed.

Fortunately the whole thing is tempered by the oversight of peer review, which prevents authors from making wild, unjustified claims about the healing power of pugs or whatever. Peer review acts against the tendency to publish radical, breakthrough results, whereas the need to amass high numbers of publications and citations pushes back against this - and peer review pushes back again by saying, "nope, that result is just too dull". By and large, papers are published which are not such tiny incremental advances as to tell you nothing at all, nor so radical as to be purely speculative and unsubstantiated. Like everything else, it's a highly imperfect system, but it functions sufficiently well to accomplish its main goal. More on peer review later, and especially in part two.


Science : a Libertarian dream ?

"Let everyone do what seems best to them" is not something that one normally associates with science, but the comparison is not completely crazy.

But hang on, all this is quite remarkable. "Competitive collaborations" describe just about anything. Farmers collaborate on their own farms but compete with each other. Tech companies collaborate internally but compete with each other. Bankers, fishermen, politicians*... it's pretty much the same across the board. And yet science avoids the perils of monopolies that plague the free market without having to resort to external regulation; it also largely avoids the destructive forces of tribalism that can obliterate sensible decision-making in politics. How in the world does it do this ?

* With strict caveats - more in part two.

Well, first, let's not go nuts with the criticism of non-science organisations. Many other institutions do also accept and discover at least some fundamental truths; some aspects of virtually all systems are successful otherwise they wouldn't last very long at all. The point here to highlight the differences between what works and what doesn't : scientists don't act scientifically when they go for a poop or cuddle a kitten; bankers don't act with ruthless self-interest all the time. Probably.

Certainly individual scientists and institutions can be persistently belligerent and foolish, yet the scientific system as a whole is robust to effects that seem - at least on occasion, definitely not always - to cripple other institutions. Or perhaps it is not so much immune as it is disease tolerant, when infections still spread but their effects are rendered impotent. That would be quite an elegant explanation as to why scientists often seem like perfectly normal people - with all the imperfections that implies - but the edifice of science as a whole produces results far greater than the sum of its often deeply flawed parts.

Still, science does have an uncanny resemblance to a Libertarian Utopia. Very few scientists indeed ever interact with government officials, and in any sensible country it's scientists who set their own agenda, not the government. As far as research goes scientists regulate themselves : peer review is a fantastic example of self-regulation that actually works. Of course the tremendous irony is that most research is government-funded, and wouldn't happen at all but for taxation. So perhaps the true Libertarian ideal is one where the government shuts up and gives people money.

This is not to say that scientists operate in complete ivory-tower independence. Different institutes operate in markedly different ways. And of course there is an interface between scientists and government, with research councils acting as buffer to prevent direct government interference. But there's little enough direct government meddling in most day-to-day research operations.

If I had to sketch out the global scientific network, I'd probably say it's something like this :

A rough concept sketch. Some institutes have very different external and internal connections, though most universities tend to be similar. Of course, the connections depend on specific research field for each institution.

Individual institutions, in my (both direct and second-hand) experience, can function quite differently to one another. Major research facilities tend to be extremely hierarchical, with strong top-down control. This is fine if your goal is to examine one single thing in one single way, e.g. CERN's search for the Higgs Boson. Smaller facilities, and most universities, tend to be more chaotic "small world" networks, where lots of people know each other, but not so much as to enforce a single viewpoint. This is much better for creativity but worse for converging on a single solution (which is precisely what gives the consensus such value - it's very hard won !).

On larger scales, connections between different institutes tend to be sparse but important; usually there are a few key individuals (older, established professors) with enormous networks, though only the most junior researchers will have no connections to other places at all. I suggest that this too is dense enough to facilitate rapid communication, but not so tightly-knit as to enforce a global consensus.

Mind you, this can only be an intuition-based sketch. Whether there are significant differences between how science and other societal institutions are organised is something I cannot properly address, though I'd very much like to see someone with network analysis experience tackle this properly. At face value it would seem that this "competitive collaboration" model isn't enough to explain why science works while other areas are dysfunctional. So I shall say no more about the network structure : it probably does matter, but it may not be the key to success. The network, I think, is in this case more a consequence than a cause of the methods scientists have adopted.


The end is not yet

We should also recognise that while other systems have problems, we should not think they are doomed. The liberal, social democracies of the West have endured enormous turbulence. While I think it's credible to suggest they're under threat, it would be a mistake to pronounce the death of any unstable system. And it's taken tremendous pressure even to bring them to their current crisis. Similarly, rumours of the death of capitalism have been perpetuated since at least the 19th century, but it's still not dead. It too has endured plenty of crises yet no credible alternatives have ever really been devised.

But it's not so much that any of these systems might be on the verge of collapse that's interesting so much that it is that they have problems which science simply doesn't. Problems of market forces creating monopolies, price fixing, and, more chronically, enormous wealth inequality and skyrocketing prices, are all real problems but solvable through regulation. No sensible person would say that the free market means it should be anything other than free in the sense of freedom under law. Democracies have problems of voters making astonishingly stupid choices; the free market of the media has led to comically absurd levels of polarisation and often outright hatred.

The point is that while economics and politics both seem to need continuous management, a guiding and hardly invisible hand of the state, science doesn't. Why ? And in particular, is the popular "efficient democracy hypothesis" even credible ?

I'll suggest on this latter point that no, it isn't. It's true that "everything's getting worse" is a popular fallacy, and by many statistical measures things are getting progressively better. Fair enough, but it would be stupid to then presume that politics must be doing anything remotely like close to optimal given the available options, let alone that the current crises are mere aberrations. I'll be blunt : anyone still supporting Brexit and/or Trump is an idiot, and most of those who supported them to begin with (especially Trump) were idiots anyway. The major reason voters didn't make such stunningly awful choices in the past is simply because they weren't given the opportunity to do so; let's not forget, of course, that politics has made mistakes the like of which modern science could scarcely believe.

And I'll also add that politics might in some way be a victim of its own success. In the past, when there were clear and present external dangers, nations have often rallied to defend themselves (though by no means always with success). But when a country is prosperous and perceives little external dangers, it falls into complacency. Bereft of outside enemies, the system has a horrible tendency to create new ones of its own people.

Okay, rant over. What has all this preamble taught us, if anything ?


Summary

Science does seem to do pretty well at selecting people who are able to do science. Since that does require some degree of both critical and analytical thinking, it would be a mistake to say that scientists are a good representative sample of the population. But it would be foolish to say that this is the only or even main factor at work : plenty of other people are intelligent, rational, and all-round good eggs. Lots of people enjoy learning and even being wrong, but other sectors seem to have problems that science doesn't.

The network also seems to be an important contributing factor but it can't be the whole story. Science balances competition and collaboration very well, but other areas try and do this but often - but by no means always - either fail or cause everyone massive problems. That's not to say that science and technology don't also cause problems too (the Industrial Revolution transformed the economy but also wrecked the planet), but those, for the most part, would seem to be a result of improper use rather than innate problems of research itself.

Make no mistake : individual scientists can be thick as shit. Yet the overall consensus always seems to do pretty well given the evidence available, whereas politics struggles to see the blindingly obvious. As for unchecked market forces, it's not that they never do anything good so much as they don't seem to give a damn about some pretty horrific side effects.

If it's not the people, and it's not the network, where else could the secret be hiding ? My guess is it's the methodology scientists have adopted. Next time I'll look at that in detail and try and see if we can apply this to other areas.